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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ANIMALS
HORSES. The plaintiff was hired by the defendant, the
owner-operator of a horse stable, to feed, water and groom
horses and to clean stables. The plaintiff was injured while
riding a horse belonging to a third party who rented stable space
and services from the defendant. The defendant had informed
the plaintiff that employees could ride only horses belonging to
the defendant. The defendant raised the defense of the Equine
Immunity Statute, La. Rev. Stat. § 9:2795.1, to exempt the
defendant from liability for the plaintiff’s injuries. The plaintiff
argued that the statute was unconstitutional in that it denied the
plaintiff due process. The court held the statute to be
constitutional because it had the rational purpose of protecting
and promoting the horse industry. Faul v. Trahan, 718 So.2d
1081 (La. Ct. App. 1998).
BANKRUPTCY
GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS .
TAX REFUNDS. The debtor filed for Chapter 7 in February
1998 and soon after filed the debtor’s personal income tax
return for 1997, claiming a refund. The debtor claimed the
refund as exempt “earnings” under Okla. Stat. Tit. 31, § 1.1.
The court held that, once the debtor’s earnings were withheld
for possible taxes, the earnings lost their character as earnings
and became taxes; therefore, the refund constituted refunded
taxes and not exempt earnings. I  re Annis, 99-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,757 (Bankr. 10th Cir. 1999).
CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
PLAN . The debtor had borrowed money to build a turkey
confinement operation. The debtor was 69 years old and had
borrowed the money for 10 years at 10 percent interest the first
year and prime plus 1 1/2 percent thereafter. When the
operation began to lose money, the debtor moved off the farm
and hired a manager to run the operation and live on the farm.
The debtor and manager had orally agreed that the manager
could purchase the farm after five years. The debtor’s plan
provided for repayment of the loan over 20 years at 7 percent
interest. The lender argued that the plan was not proposed in
good faith because the debtor was no longer in farming and the
interest rate was not high enough on the plan deferred
payments. The court held that the debtor had sufficient interest
in the farm to be eligible for Chapter 12. The court also held
that the plan was confirmable to the extent the plan provided
reasonable projections of income and expenses, given the
farm’s history of producing actual profit even though the farm
produced tax losses. However, the court held that the plan could
not be confirmed because 20 years was too long for a debtor
who was already 69 years old and the interest rate could not be
lower than 7.5 percent which provided for a riskless rate of 5.5
percent plus 2 percent for risk. In re Lockard, 234 B.R. 484
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1999).
FEDERAL TAXATION     -ALM § 13.03[7].*
ESTATE PROPERTY . The debtors filed for Chapter 7 on
December 14, 1998. The case does not indicate whether the
debtors made the election to end their 1998 tax year as of the
date of the petition. The debtors timely filed their 1998 tax
return which claimed a refund. The trustee sought turnover of
the refund as estate property. The court held that the refund was
estate property but, citing In re Witmer, 228 B.R. 841 (Bankr.
W.D. Va. 1998), decreased the amount by 17/365 to account for
the number of days in 1998 that occurred post-petition. In re
Webb, 234 B.R. 96 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1999).
SALE OF RESIDENCE. The Chapter 7 debtor owned a
residence which would have produced $7,800 for creditors after
the debtor’s exemption if sold by the trustee and the trustee was
eligible for the I.R.C. § 121 exclusion of gain. The trustee
sought permission from the court to sell the residence to the
debtor for $7,000. The court permitted the sale and held that the
trustee would have been eligible for the gain exclusion. As
noted in the last issue, the IRS has acquiesced on this issue. In
re Bailey, 234 B.R. 7 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1999).
CONTRACTS
HEDGE-TO-ARRIVE CONTRACTS. The plaintiffs were
grain farmers who had entered into hedge-to-arrive (HTA)
contracts with a cooperative for the sale of corn, with the
contract contemplating delivery of the crop but allowing for the
contract to be “rolled” to a later date.  The contracts contained
an “options” clause which resulted in the creation of new
HTAs.  These were “calls” which the producers sold through
the cooperative.  The cooperative was expected to maintain any
hedge on the commodity and pay the expenses of keeping the
hedge in place including margin calls.  The court first
concluded that the contacts did not allow unlimited rolling and
did not allow for unilateral cancellation.  The court reasoned
that the contracts, therefore, were valid cash forward contracts
because the producers were obligated to make physical delivery
of the corn at some future time or to negotiate a settlement short
of delivery.  The court then turned to the question of whether
the options clauses made the contracts illegal under the
Commodity Exchange Act.  The option clauses conferred on
the cooperative the right, but not the obligation, to purchase
corn at a specified price on a future date.  The court noted that
there is no cash forward contract exception for options.
Besides, the Court observed, the options were not a marketing
technique but were speculative in nature.  When the cooperative
exercised the option clauses, the producers entered into
additional HTAs to satisfy their obligations.  The court said the
additional or “resultant” HTAs were unenforceable.  But the
court held that the option clauses were severable from the
original HTAs which remained enforceable. CoBank v.
Alexander, No. 3:96CV7687 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
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FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
CROP INSURANCE. The FCIC has issued proposed
regulations which amend the Forage Production Crop Insurance
Provisions and Forage Seeding Crop Insurance Provisions, and
delete Forage Production Winter Coverage Endorsement. The
forage policy is revised by: allowing optional units; changing
the cancellation and termination dates in California, Nevada
and Utah; requiring the insured to report all forage acreage on
or before each date specified in the Special Provisions;
changing dates when insurance attaches and when insurance
ends; extending dates in some counties in California to allow
year round coverage; clarifying that insurance is not available
for damage or loss of production that occurs after removal from
windrow; allowing forage to be direct marketed; and including
optional unit procedures in the event of a loss. The forage
seeding policy is revised by: adding cancellation and
termination dates for California and South Dakota; requiring
the insured to report all insurable forage seeding acreage on or
before each acreage reporting date specified in the Special
Provisions; specifying in all states and in California, unless
otherwise specified in the Special Provisions, forage damaged
before the final planting date must be replanted to the extent
that the forage has less than a 75 percent stand; allowing a
replant payment in California, unless otherwise specified in the
Special Provisions, on any acreage planted to the insured crop
that is damaged by an insurable cause of loss occurring within
the insurance period to the extent that less than 75 percent of
normal stand remains; allowing increased replanting payments
if specified in the Special Provisions; and removing the 10
percent planted acreage requirements. The proposed regulations
also restrict the effect of the current Forage Production and
Forage Seeding Crop Insurance Regulations to the 2000 and
prior crop years. 64 Fed. Reg. 46599 (Aug. 26, 1999).
EMERGENCY LOANS. The plaintiff was a farmer who
operated a farm through a wholly-owned corporation. The
corporation applied for an emergency loan but the application
was denied because the corporation would not be able to repay
the loans. The denial was appealed to the National Appeals
Division (NAD) and, during the appeal, the corporation filed
for bankruptcy. The plaintiff then attempted to be substituted
for the corporation in the loan application. The substitution
issue was raised at the appeal level but was denied as outside
the scope of the appeal. The plaintiff, now also in bankruptcy,
sought judicial review of the substitution issue. The USDA
argued that the plaintiff had not exhausted the administrative
appeals process. The plaintiff argued that further administrative
appeals were useless because (1) the NAD had ruled on the
matter and (2) the USDA had indicated that it would not
substitute the plaintiff for the corporation. The court held that
the plaintiff had not exhausted all administrative appeals
because (1) the substitution issue was not raised in a separate
appeal and (2) the USDA decision was still appealable. Bent ey
v. Glickman, 234 B.R. 12 (N.D. N.Y. 1999).
PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS ACT . The plaintiff
purchased cattle under a “Beef Marketing Agreement” which
was proposed by a group of Kansas feedlots.  Under the
agreement, the plaintiff would make an initial bid on a pen of
cattle.  The initial bid was based on the midpoint between the
highest purchase price reported by USDA in a given week in
Kansas for at least 2500 cattle and the highest price the plaintiff
paid for the same number of cattle in Kansas during the week.
This was called the “Kansas High Price.” The feedlot could
than accept or reject the bid.  If the bid was rejected, then other
cattle buyers could bid.  But as long as the plaintiff's initial bid
wa  no less than 50 cents below the Kansas High Price, the
plaintiff had a right of first refusal on the cattle.  Thus, once
other buyers had completed bidding, the feedlot had to offer the
pen of cattle to the plaintiff at the highest bid price.  If the
plaintiff opted to exercise the right of first refusal, the feedlot
could go back to the high bidder in an attempt to get a higher
bid.  But after all bidding was completed, the plaintiff could
st ll get the cattle by matching the highest bid. The USDA
rgued that the right of first refusal violated the Packers and
Stocky rds Act which makes it unlawful for a packer to engage
in “ ny unfair, unjustly discriminatory, or deceptive practice”
or “make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or
advantage to any particular person or locality….” The Judicial
Officer had concluded that the plaintiff did not have to
participate in bidding after its initial bid and could obtain a pen
of cattle by matching, instead of exceeding, the highest bid. The
appellate court disagreed and said the right of first refusal did
not have the effect of suppressing or reducing competition.
Indeed, the court said that the plaintiff paid a higher price for
cattle under the agreement than for cattle bought in transactions




DISCLAIMERS . The decedent and surviving spouse owned
a joint account with a brokerage firm. The surviving spouse was
appointed executor of the decedent’s estate. After the death of
the decedent, the surviving spouse received an income check
from the brokerage firm and deposited the entire amount in the
decedent’s and spouse’s joint bank account. The spouse then
withdrew half of the amount and deposited that into the estate’s
account. The spouse also had the property in the joint brokerage
account placed in an account solely in the spouse’s name. The
spouse did not make use of any of the brokerage account before
disclaiming any interest in the decedent’s portion of the
account. The IRS ruled that the surviving spouse had not
accepted any of the benefits of the decedent’s portion of the
account prior to filing the disclaimer; therefore, the disclaimer
was qualified. Ltr. Rul. 9932042, May 19, 1999.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BUSINESS EXPENSES. The taxpayer was self-employed as
a computer engineer and claimed three payments as business
expenses. However, the taxpayer provided no corroborating
evidence of the business purpose of the expenses and the court
denied the deduction as business expenses. Simpson v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-274.
CAPITAL GAIN . As amended in 1997, I.R.C. § 1(h)
generally divides a taxpayer's net capital gain into several rate
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groups. A maximum marginal rate of 25 percent applies to
unrecaptured section 1250 gain (25-percent gain), which is
defined in I.R.C. § 1(h)(7)(A) as the amount of long-term
capital gain (not otherwise treated as ordinary income) that
would be treated as ordinary income if I.R.C. § 1250(b)(1)
included all depreciation and the applicable percentage under
I.R.C. § 1250(a) were 100 percent, reduced by any net loss in
the 28-percent rate category. A maximum marginal rate of 20
percent applies to adjusted net capital gain (20/10-percent gain),
defined in I.R.C. § 1(h)(4) as the portion of net capital gain that
is not taxed at the 28-percent or 25-percent rates. A reduced
rate of 10 percent is applied to the portion of the taxpayer's
adjusted net capital gain that would otherwise be taxed at a 15-
percent rate. The IRS has adopted as final regulations which
provide that, if a portion of the capital gain from an installment
sale of real depreciable property consists of 25-percent gain,
and a portion consists of 20/10-percent gain, the taxpayer is
required to take the 25-percent gain into account before the
20/10-percent gain, as payments are received. In addition, an
example in the regulations illustrates that I.R.C. § 1231 gain
from an installment sale that is recharacterized as ordinary gain
under I.R.C. § 1231(c) is deemed to consist first of 25-percent
gain, and then 20/10-percent gain. Consistent with this
treatment and with the general rule that 25-percent gain is taken
into account first, another example in the regulations illustrates
that, where there is installment gain that is characterized as
ordinary gain under I.R.C. § 1231(a) because there is a net
section 1231 loss for the year, the gain is treated as consisting
of 25-percent gain first, before 20/10-percent gain, for purposes
of determining how much 25-percent gain remains to be taken
into account in later payments. The final regulations also
provide that the capital gain rates applicable to installment
payments that are received on or after the effective date of the
1997 Act from sales prior to the effective date are determined
as if, for all payments received after the date of sale but before
the effective date, 25-percent gain had been taken into account
before 20/10-percent gain. The regulations further provide that,
in the event the cumulative amount of 25-percent gain actually
reported in installment payments received during the period
between the effective date of I.R.C. § 1(h) and the effective
date of these regulations was less than the amount that would
have been reported using the front-loaded allocation method of
the regulations, the amount of 25-percent gain actually
reported, rather than an amount determined under a front-
loaded allocation method, must be used in determining the
amount of 25-percent gain that remains to be reported. 64 Fed.
Reg. 45874 (Aug. 23, 1999), adding Treas. Reg. § 1.453-12.
CASUALTY LOSS . The taxpayer was an S corporation
which operated a racetrack. A portion of the property was
flooded in one tax year and the taxpayer claimed a casualty loss
deduction for flood damage. The taxpayer claimed the loss
based on the decrease in the fair market value of the entire
property. The court held that, under Treas. Reg. § 1.165-
7(b)(2)(i), casualty loss deduction were allowable only for
losses associated with a “single, identifiable property damaged
or destroyed.” The court found that the taxpayer had not
identified the amount of loss associated with single pieces of
real or personal property; therefore, none of the loss could be
deducted. As an example, the court noted that the taxpayer had
identified $300,000 of costs from employees repairing the
damages. The court noted that these expenses were deductible
s ordinary and necessary business expenses and would
produce a double deduction if also allowed as a casualty loss
deduction. The taxpayer admitted that it could not clearly
allocate the casualty losses to specific property with a specific
tax asis. The court concluded that no loss deduction could be
allowed without sufficient evidence of income tax basis for
single pieces of property damaged by the flood. The opinion is
designated as not for publication. Trinity Meadows Raceway,
In . v. Comm’r, 99-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,754 (6th
Cir. 1999).
CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02.*
CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDENDS. A corporation was owned
by two shareholders, one owning 90 percent of the stock and
the other 10 percent. The company instituted an incentive
compensation plan based upon the company’s total sales as
compared to an average industry margin. The shareholders were
the only participants and the payments were often greater than
provided by the plan. The court held that the standard to be
applied was (1) whether the plan had any disguised dividend
element and (2) whether the payments were reasonable
compensation. The court held that the plan had a disguised
dividend element because (1) 81 to 94 percent of the
corporation’s earning were paid as compensation; (2) the
corporation never declared dividends; (3) the payments were
greater than provided by the plan; and (4) the payments were
inconsistent with a compensatory intent because (a) only the
shareholders were eligible, (b) the payments were based on
earnings, and (c) the payments were not based on services
rendered but had the effect of distributing all of the
corporation’s earnings. The court disallowed the deduction of
the plan payments as employee compensation. O.S.C. &
Associates, Inc. v. Comm’r, 99-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,765 (9th Cir. 1999).
DISTRIBUTIONS OF STOCK. The IRS has issued proposed
regulati ns relating to recognition of gain on certain
distributions of stock or securities of a controlled corporation in
connection with an acquisition. 64 Fed. Reg. 46155 (Aug. 24,
1999).
PIERCING OF CORPORATE VEIL. The taxpayers had
transferred farm property to a corporation and two business
trusts, although the taxpayers continued to use and operate the
farm as owners. The corporation did not keep separate records
or ccou ts and did not file state and federal tax returns. The
taxpayers used the assets for personal and business purposes
without compensating the corporation. The IRS sought to
collect assessment of back taxes from the corporation’s and
trusts’ assets, arguing that the entities were shams created
merely to evade payment of the taxes. The court held that the
IRS could collect on the taxes from the corporation’s and trusts’
assets a  belonging to the taxpayers because the corporation and
trusts we  merely the alter ego of the taxpayers who did not
maintain the formalities of the entities and who treated the
entities’ assets as their own. The court also found that the
taxpayers formed the entities under the guidance and advice of
known promoters of abusive tax shelters and the promoters
were the trustees of the trusts. United States v. Scherping,  99-
2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,758 (8th Cir. 1999).
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. The IRS has revoked
the following 1991 letter ruling. The taxpayer had negotiated a
debt settlement with a creditor resulting in release of
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indebtedness for less than fair market value. The taxpayer had
not filed for bankruptcy. The IRS ruled that the value of the
taxpayer's personal and real property exempt under state law
was not included in determining the taxpayer's insolvency for
purposes of the insolvency exclusion of I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(B).
In the current ruling, the IRS examined the legislative history of
I.R.C. § 108 and found no clear authority for excluding exempt
property from the insolvency calculation and concluded that,
because I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(B) did not expressly exclude exempt
property, the value of exempt property was to be included in
determining the solvency of a taxpayer who has discharge of
indebtedness income. Neil Harl will publish an article on this
issue in a future issue of the Digest. Ltr. Rul. 9932013, May 4,
1999), revoking, Ltr. Rul. 9125010, March 19, 1991.
The taxpayer owned real and personal property with the
taxpayer’s spouse as tenants by the entirety. The taxpayer was
obligated to a lender which canceled a portion of the loan. The
taxpayer excluded the assets held as tenants by the entirety in
determining that the taxpayer was insolvent at the time of the
loan cancellation and could exclude the discharge of
indebtedness income from taxable income. The IRS ruled,
however, that the entire value of the assets held as tenants by
the entirety was to be included in determining whether the
taxpayer was solvent at the time of loan cancellation; therefore,
because the taxpayer was solvent at the time of loan
cancellation, the discharge of indebtedness amount was
included in taxable income. FSA Ltr. Rul. 9932019, May 10,
1999.
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS . The IRS has provided guidance
relating to the repeal of the combined limitation on defined
benefit and defined contributions plans under I.R.C. § 415(e) by
the Small Business Job Protection Act (Pub. L. No. 104-88).
The repeal was effective for limitation years beginning on or
after Jan. 1, 1998. Notice 99-44, I.R.B. 1999-35.
INFORMATION REPORTING . The IRS has issued
general guidelines for reporting requirements where a trucking
company makes payments to third party trucking companies for
freight costs. I.R.C. § 6041(a) provides, in part, that all persons
engaged in a trade or business and making payment in the
course of the trade or business to another person of rent,
salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, compensations,
remunerations, emoluments, or other fixed or determinable
gains, profits, and income of $600 or more in any taxable year
shall render a true and accurate return to the Secretary of the
Treasury setting forth the amount of those gains, profits, and
income and the name and address of the recipient of such
payment.  I.R.C. § 6041A states that if any service-recipient
engaged in a trade or business pays in the course of such trade
or business during any calender year remuneration to any
person for services performed by such person, and the
aggregate of such remuneration paid to such person during such
calender year is $600 or more, then the service recipient shall
make a return setting forth the aggregate amount of such
payments and the name and address of the recipient of such
payments. The term “service-recipient” means the person for
whom the service is performed. Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-3(d)
excepts freight payments from information reporting. I.R.C. §
6041A was added to the law by §312(a) of the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, 1982-2 C.B. 561. The
Conference Report stated that until new regulations are issued
under I.R.C. § 6041A, the existing regulatory exceptions under
I.R.C. § 6041 will continue to apply. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 760,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 567 (1982), 1982-2 C.B. 646. Because no
new applicable regulatory exception has been issued under
I.R.C. § 6041A, the exception contained in Treas. Reg. §
1.6041-3(d) applies to information reporting under I.R.C. §
6041A.  The exception for “freight” has been in existence since
1918. The IRS stated that it has consistently interpreted the
term “freight” using its plain meaning, i.e., as a method or
s rvice for transporting goods or the cost of such transportation.
This interpretation results in a general exception from reporting
of payments for truck, rail, ship, and air freight services.  The
IRS ruled that, if a trucking company has reached its hauling
capacity and contracts with another trucking company to haul
excess livestock or goods and an employer-employee
relationship has not been created, it appears that the payment is
for the cost of transporting goods or “freight.” Additionally, the
IRS noted that payments to incorporated trucking companies
are excepted from reporting by Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-3(c). Ltr.
Rul. 9932048, June 17, 1999.
INTEREST . The taxpayers paid interest on a tax deficiency
which arose from investment income and the taxpayers claimed
th  interest on taxes as a business expense deduction. The court
agre d with the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts
of Appeals that interest paid on federal income taxes is
nondeductible personal interest. Davis v. United States, 99-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,783 (W.D. Tex. 1999).
INTEREST RATE .  The IRS has announced that, for the
period October 1, 1999 through December 31, 1999, the interest
rat  paid on tax overpayments is 8 percent (7 percent in the case
of a corporation) and for underpayments is 8 percent. The
interest rate for underpayments by large corporations is 10
percent  The overpayment rate for the portion of a corporate
overpayment exceeding $10,000 is 5.5 percent. Rev. Rul. 99-
36, I.R.B. 1999-__.
LEASE VERSUS INSTALLMENT PURCHASE . The
t xpayer leased over 500 trucks. The lease agreements
contained terminal rent adjustment clauses (TRACs) providing
for compensation to the taxpayer from the lessor if the trucks
sold for more than the remaining lease amount plus the costs of
sale. Under I.R.C. § 7701(h), a TRAC was to be disregarded if
the vehicle lease would otherwise be treated as a lease. The IRS
argued that the TRAC should still be a factor in determining
whether  vehicle lease was really a lease for tax purposes. The
court held that the plaintiff’s leases were standard equipment
leases; therefore, the TRACs were to be disregarded for tax
purpo es. Neil Harl will publish an article on this issue in a
future issue of the Digest. Peaden v. Comm’r, 113 T.C. No. 6
(1999).
PENSION PLANS . For plans beginning in August 1999, the
weighted average is 6.01 percent with the permissible range of
5.41 to 6.31 percent (90 to 106 percent permissible range) and
5.41 to 6.61 percent (90 to 110 percent permissible range) for
purposes of determining the full funding limitation under I.R.C.
§ 412(c)(7).  Notice 99-38, I.R.B. 1999-31, 134.
The taxpayer was a corporation which sponsored a qualified
deferred compensation plan. The plan and some of the
taxpayer’s employee filed a suit against a securities brokerage
firm and the taxpayer paid the litigation costs. The taxpayer
sought to deduct these costs as costs of administering the plan.
The IRS argued that, under Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-3(d),
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administrative costs were deductible only if reoccurring, but the
court held that the costs were deductible because they were
ordinary and necessary costs of administering the plan. Sklar,
Greenstein & Scheer, P.C. v. Comm’r, 113 T.C. No. 9
(1999).
RETURNS. The IRS has announced that its web site,
http://www.irs.ustreas.gov, contains an interactive calculator
that helps taxpayers on installment plans figure their monthly
payment amounts and then prints out an installment agreement
form for them to file. It is to be used by individuals who have
filed their returns and are not already paying taxes under an
installment agreement. IR-1999-69.




AFR 5.42 5.35 5.31 5.29
110 percent AFR 5.98 5.89 5.85 5.82
120 percent AFR 6.52 6.42 6.37 6.34
Mid-term
AFR 5.98 5.89 5.85 5.82
110 percent AFR 6.58 6.48 6.43 6.39
120 percent AFR 7.19 7.07 7.01 6.97
Long-term
AFR 6.25 6.14 6.11 6.08
110 percent AFR 6.89 6.78 6.72 6.69
120 percent AFR 7.53 7.39 7.32 7.28
Rev. Rul. 99-37, I.R.B. 1999-__.
TRAVEL EXPENSES . The taxpayer was self-employed as a
printing consultant. The taxpayer’s permanent residence and in-
home business office were in Illinois but over five years, the
taxpayer provided extensive consulting for a client in
California. Although the consulting was temporary in nature,
several circumstances required the taxpayer to make several
trips of extended length to California, enough to make it- less
expensive for the taxpayer to rent a small, sparsely furnished
apartment in California. The IRS argued that the taxpayer’s tax
home was in California for the five years because of the length
of time spent with the client and the need for the apartment. The
court held that the travel expenses to California were deductible
business expenses because (1) the permanent residence was in
Illinois, (2) the taxpayer was available and did provide services
to other clients in other states from the Illinois office, and (3)
the work in California was always intended to be temporary.
Mitchell v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-283.
LANDLORD AND TENANT
EMBLEMENTS . The plaintiff had a remainder interest in
farm land after the plaintiff’s parents deeded the land to the
plaintiff and reserved a life estate. The land was cropshare
leased to a third party. The last life tenant died in July 1996 and
the issue was the ownership of the landlord’s share of the crops
harvested the following autumn. The deed to the plaintiff did
not mention this contingency. The court held that, under the
doctrine of emblements under state law, the crops belonged to
the life tenant since the life tenancy document did not provide
otherwise. Therefore, at the termination of the life tenancy, the
crops belonged to the life tenant’s estate and not to the
remainder holder, the plaintiff. Heinold v. Siecke, __ N.W.2d
__ (Neb. 1999).
NUISANCE
HOG CONFINEMENT FACILITY . The defendant
operated a 2,880 head hog production facility and the plaintiffs
were neighbors who sought to enjoin the operation as a
nuisance. The defendant had made several improvements to
control odors from the waste lagoon. The defendant presented
evidence that the odor controlling methods were the best
available. At trial the plaintiffs sought to include a jury
instruction that there was no legal defense that a farm operation
was not a nuisance if the farm used “state-of-the-art”
technology to control odors. The plaintiff appealed the trial
judges refusal to include that instruction to the jury. The court
held that the proposed instruction accurately described the law
of nuisance in North Carolina, that the efforts of a defendant to
control the odors was irrelevant as to the issue of the existence
of a nuisance. The court held that the issue of the defendant’s
efforts to control the odors was sufficiently important in the
case to require the jury instruction to prevent jury confusion as
to the law to be applied in the case and remanded the case for a
new trial. Parker v. Barefoot, 502 S.E.2d 42 (N.C. Ct. App.
1998).
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
STABLE WORKER . The plaintiff was hired by the
defendant, the owner-operator of a horse stable, to feed, water
and groom horses and to clean stables. The plaintiff was injured
while riding a horse belonging to a third party who rented stable
space and services from the defendant. The plaintiff argued that
the plaintiff was an independent contractor and not restricted to
a claim under Workers’ compensation for the injuries. The
court held that the evidence was sufficient to find that the
plaintiff was an employee because the plaintiff’s duties were
under the control of the defendant. The plaintiff also argued that
the claim was an intentional tort excepted from the workers’
compensation coverage. The court held that the evidence
presented a close question as to the defendant’s knowledge of
the horse’s propensity to “flip;” therefore, the court deferred to
the trial court’s judgment as to the credibility of the witnesses
which supported the verdict for the defendant. Faul v. Trahan,
718 So.2d 1081 (La. Ct. App. 1998).
CITATION UPDATES
In re Griffith, 174 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 1999), rev’g and
rem’g, 210 B.R. 216 (S.D. Fla. 1997), aff’g, 161 B.R. 727
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supra.
Richmond v. United States, 172 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 1999),
aff’g, 234 B.R. 787 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (automatic stay) see p.
115 supra.
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